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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant-
Cross Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.20050046-SC 
SEAN GRAHAM, : 
Defendant/Appellee-
Cross Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted the State's and Defendant's respective petitions for permission 
for interlocutory appeal in order for this Court to review the "Findings of Fact and Order 
Granting Defendant Sean Graham's Motion to Quash Amended Information; and, Bind-
Over Order." R746-41. 
This Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals involving a first degree or 
capital felony. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h); Utah R.App. P. 5. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The pertinent statutes are attached as Addendum A to Appellant's Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Seventeen-year-old co-defendants Sean Graham (Defendant) and Jesse Simmons 
(Simmons) were charged with aggravated murder, a capital offense (U.C.A. § 76-5-202)l; 
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony (U.C.A. § 76-5-301); theft of an operable 
motor vehicle, a second degree felony (U.C.A. § 76-6-404); and theft, a class A 
misdemeanor (U.C.A. § 76-6-404). R4-2; R169:l 1-12. On the prosecutor's motion, the 
magistrate reduced the theft charge from a class A to a class B misdemeanor. R 169:211-
12. The State charged four aggravating circumstances, thereby elevating the murder to 
aggravated murder: 
(1) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the 
commission of a kidnapping, U.C.A. § 76-5-202(l)(d); 
(2) The homicide was committed for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or 
another's escape from lawful custody. U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(e); 
(3) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain. U.C.A. § 
76-5-202(1 )(f)2; and, 
(4) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or 
exceptionally depraved manner. U.C.A § 76-5-202(l)(p). R4-3. 
1
 The State initially sought the death penalty. The United States Supreme Court has since 
held it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to execute persons who were 
under 18 years old when they committed their capital murders. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 
S.Ct. 1183 (2005). Thus, if convicted of aggravated murder, the defendant could be 
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 20 years to life or to life without the 
possibility of parole. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(1) (West 2004). 
2
 Utah Laws 2005, c. 143, rewrote Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202, and re-lettered 
subdivision (f) as subdivision (g). 
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Bindover Order. After a joint preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound both 
Defendants over on all counts. R166-63; Rl74:13-21. The Defendant was bound over for 
aggravated murder on a theory of accomplice liability because he aided Defendant 
Simmons in the conduct which resulted in the death of the victim. (R166-163; R174:13-15). 
Motion to Quash Bindover Order. On September 16, 2004, Defendant filed 
a motion to quash the amended information. R224-23; R270-28; R738:26-27. 
On November 15, 2004, a hearing was held on the motion. R738. At the hearing, 
the State contended the kidnapping commenced upon the victim being hit in the head by 
Defendant Simmons. R738:9. 
On December 28, 2004, the District Court filed the "Findings of Fact and Order 
Granting Defendant Sean Graham's Motion to Quash Amended Information; and, Bind-
Over Order" (hereinafter referred to as "Order Quashing Amended Information"), 
thereby partially granting Defendant's motion to quash the amended information. R746-
41. (See Addendum C to Appellant's Brief). Iron County Attorney Scott Garrett 
approved the form and content of the Order Quashing Amended Information. R746-41. 
Based its findings, the court: (1) quashed the bind over order as to aggravated 
murder (U.C.A. § 76-5-202); (2) refused to bind Defendant over for second degree 
murder under the felony murder rule (U.C.A. § 76-5-203, subdivision (2)(d)); (3) bound 
Defendant over for second degree murder under U.C.A. § 76-5-203, subdivisions (2)(b) 
and (2)(c); and, (4) bound Defendant over for kidnapping (U.C.A. § 76-5-301) and 
aggravated kidnapping (U.C.A. § 76-5-302). R746:42-41. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June of 2003, Defendant's parents voluntarily placed him in the Maximum Life 
Skills Academy ("Academy") (R169:176) pursuant to an "Enrollment Agreement." 
R169:169, 176. Michael Ahquin, the Academy Director, testified the agreement 
provided the Academy with "guardianship" of the Defendant. R169:169. He was not 
free to leave (R169:170) unless he was released to his parents, the contract is terminated, 
or he graduated. R169:170, 175-176. The Defendant was not ordered to attend the 
Academy by any Court (R169:176, 178) and no evidence was presented that he was in 
the actual or constructive custody of any youth correctional facility, jail, prison, or any 
other penal institution. The Defendant was scheduled to go home on March 4, 2004 
(R169:149) but he and Simmons had been caught cheating on a test (R169:172) which 
prolonged their stay. R169:149. They were also being watched because one of the staff 
had heard them talking about running away. R169:139. Although the Academy had 
planned to release them, Jake Truman, a youth counselor at the Academy (R169:136-
137), believed the parents wanted them to remain. R169:149. The decision as to whether 
a juvenile leaves the Academy is usually up to the parents. R169:149. 
On the date of the homicide (March 8, 2004), there were six boys at the Academy: 
Jessie Katches ("Katches"), Nick Relich ("Relich"), Steven Kim ("Kim"), Satchell, 
Simmons, and Defendant. R169-189, 59. They were on a "shut down" or "lock down." 
R169:138. When the Academy is in "lock down", "pretty much all privileges are 
revoked." R169:155. The residents basically sit at a desk (R169:155) and are not 
allowed to participate in any activities or interact with one another. R169:59:5-8; 155:19. 
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Relich and Kim slept downstairs (Rl69:22, 59) while Satchell, Katches, Simmons and 
Defendant slept in the upstairs living room. R169:138-139. 
Around 8:00 p.m., Satchell and Katches were getting ready for bed. R169:18, 88. 
They were lying on the floor about three feet apart (R 169:43) and parallel to each other, 
facing the same direction. R169:91. Satchell was facing the coat closet (R169:45-46, 68) 
and "had a clear view of the top of the stairs, closet and a little down the office area." 
Rl69:46, 69. Satchell testified Simmons and Defendant "were beyond the wall so it was 
kind of hard to see if they were doing anything [...]" R169:23. They were lying right 
next to each other (Rl69:43-44) facing in the same direction as Satchell and Katches 
(R169:91) toward the stairs (R169:91) with their feet about two feet from Satchell's head 
(R 169:44). The wall is about four feet high (R 169:46) and stretches from the top of the 
stairs back to the end of the room. Rl 69:46. 
At about 9:00 p.m. (R169:21) the victim ("Arnett") came on duty. Two staff were 
leaving (R 169:89) and Arnett began setting up near an upstairs closet. R 169:23. He was 
the only staff on duty. Rl69:21. Satchell and Katches were talking (Rl69:23) and 
Simmons and Defendant were whispering. R 169:23, 46. Arnett got angry because they 
were not supposed to be talking. Rl69:23. He yelled something like: "Be quiet"; "Its 
time to go to bed"; or, "Time to go to sleep." R169:45. Satchell and Katches stopped 
talking and got into bed. Rl69:23:9-10. About 10 minutes after starting work (Rl69:23-
25), Arnett went downstairs (R169:24) to check the rooms and arm the alarm. R169:89. 
Simmons and the Defendant stopped talking (R 169:93) and Defendant got up and 
crouched down (Rl69:24, 93) against a wall facing downstairs. Rl69:93-94. Katches 
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said Defendant could look down the stairs and at Simmons. Rl69:94. Simmons and 
Defendant were in those locations for about a minute before Arnett came back up the 
stairs. Rl69:48. 
As Amett ascended the stairs Simmons pulled a baseball bat out from under his 
sheets. Rl69:25, 49, 71. Satchell did not know the bat was there (Rl69:25) and had not 
seen it that day. Rl69:71. The "[Defendant] kind of glanced over to [Simmons]'5 
(R169:95, 113) "when [Arnett] was comin' up the stairs, ah, just about when [Arnett]'s 
head was visible to me, [Simmons] stood up and he pulled a bat from the side of his bed. 
And he stood up and hit [Arnett] in the back of the head." Rl69:93. Nothing was said 
between Simmons and Defendant (Rl69:72) prior to Simmons swinging the bat. 
R169:94-95. Arnett fell toward the wall facing the stairs. R169:95. He fell by the desk 
(R169:125) and dropped his keys to the house and van (Rl69:25, 50, 72), which he did 
not pick up. Rl69:25. Although Satchell thought Defendant picked the keys up right 
after Arnett walked away (Rl69:50), Katches testified he did not see Amett drop the 
keys. R169:114. After Amett fell, Simmons and Defendant stood up and Simmons put 
the bat back by his bed. Rl69:96-97. When Amett stood up he grabbed his head 
(Rl 69:96) and "was kind of moaning" and did not seem to know what had happened. 
Rl69:25-26. Simmons and Defendant said something like: "Are you okay?", "What 
happened?", or, "Did you trip?" Rl69:26, 96. Amett walked into the office and shut the 
door. R169:28, 96. He was in the office "for about three to four minutes." R169:27. 
When he "went into the office, [Defendant] looked at [Simmons] and said, 'Why didn't 
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you knock him out the first time?' You know, somethin' like that." Rl69:27. When 
Amett came out of the office he went downstairs and outside. Rl 69:27. 
When Katches heard Amett come back in the front door, Simmons and Defendant 
"crouched back down toward where they were." Rl 69:98, 117. Defendant was "against 
this wall like he was before" (Rl69:98) and looking down the stairs. Rl69:98-99. 
Simmons was "doing the exact same thing as before. Crouching, facing this way kinda 
[...]" behind the wall with the bat in his hands. R169:28, 99. Simmons and Defendant 
did not talk during this time. Rl69:28; 97, 98. Defendant glanced over at Simmons as 
Amett came up the stairs, (R169:117) and Simmons "took the bat up and [...] hit him" 
(R169:99) in the back of the head. R169:28. After Amett was hit a second time, he fell 
to the floor and started convulsing. Rl69:28. He fell "no more than two to three feet - -
three feet from the closet" (R169:81) which "[...] is literally right there at the top of the 
stairs." Rl 69:81. Simmons and Defendant grabbed Amett by the legs and upper torso 
(R169:101:7-8) and placed him in the closet (R169:29) on his back (R169:77) with his 
legs up in the air (R169:77) over his head (R169:101) and against a cabinet. R169:78. 
His head was on the floor next to the wall (R169:30, 77) "on the left [...] bottom comer 
and his feet were over on the right side." R169:101. Amett was moved two to three feet 
"at the most" to the closet from where he fell on the floor. R169:131. Katches view was 
unobstructed (R169:99). Katches never saw Defendant strike Amett or swing the bat. 
Rl 69:110. Satchell was surprised at what happened (Rl69:33), but did nothing to stop it. 
Rl69:33. After Amett was put in the closet, Simmons and Defendant locked the closet 
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(R169:101), collected their belongings (R169:31), and drove off in the Academy's van. 
R169:32:18-19, 102:25. 
After Simmons and Defendant left the Academy, Satchell and Katches tried to 
open the closet door but could not do so because it was locked. Rl69:34. They tried to 
call for help but could not do so because the phone lines had been cut. Rl69:33-34, 104. 
Satchell and Katches ran to the home of the director of the Academy (who was not at 
home) and then to the home of a counselor, Jake Truman, for help. R 169:34-38, 106, 
140, 157. Truman and the boys drove back to the Academy. R169:106, 141-142. 
Truman used a kitchen knife to open the closet door. R169:106, 141-142. Truman called 
911 on his cell phone. R169:142, 146. Truman removed Amett from the closet. 
(R169:150) and stayed with Arnett until the EMT's arrived. R169:151. Arnett died the 
following day on March 9, 2004 at 7:20 p.m. as a result of his having sustained blunt 
force trauma to his head. R169:188:l-3; 192:2-4. 
On the evening of March 9, 2004, Simmons and Defendant were apprehended by 
law enforcement in Las Vegas, Nevada. R169: 201. 
The prosecution did not present any evidence at the preliminary hearing to prove: 
Arnett died because he was placed in the closet, or, the manner in which he was placed in 
the closet caused or contributed to his death (R169); or, Arnett would not have died if he 
immediately received medical treatment or was unable to immediately receive medical 
treatment because the phone lines were cut and/or the closet door was locked. R169. 
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SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Issue No. 1: "Was there sufficient evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing to support a reasonable belief that Defendant, as an accomplice, 
'intentionally or knowingly' killed the victim?" 
Summary of Defendant's Response to Issue No. 1: First, the trial court 
correctly found that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to sustain a 
finding that the Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Arnett within 
the meaning of U.C.A. §76-5-202(1)." R746:45-44. 
Second, portions of the Order Quashing Amended Information, refer to the 
requisite mental state for aggravated murder as "specific intent". R746:745-744. 
However, the content of the Order was approved by the Iron County Attorney prior to its 
submission to the court for filing. R746:41. Hence, the State not only failed to object to 
the use of the term "specific intent" to describe the requisite mental state for aggravated 
murder, but the State approved of the use of this term. Therefore, the State waived any 
irregularity or impropriety in the use of this term and should not be able to raise this issue 
on appeal.3 
Third, in order to be found liable as an "accomplice" to aggravated murder, a 
defendant must be found to have "intentionally aided" the principal in the commission of 
an aggravated murder. The prosecution did not present sufficient evidence the Defendant 
'State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, % 7, 44 P.3d 658; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 
1993); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 
(Utah 1983); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1103 (Utah 1994). 
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provided aid to Simmons with the intent that Simmons kill Arnett. U.C.A. §§ 76-2-202; 
J6-5-202. 
Fourth, in order to commit the crimes of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping, 
the perpetrator necessarily possesses the intent to keep his victim alive, at least for a short 
period of time. U.C.A. §§ 76-5-301, 76-5-302; State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 
1981). Conversely, in order to commit the crime of aggravated murder, the perpetrator 
must possess the intent to kill when he performs the act that causes the death of another. 
U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1). Therefore, a perpetrator cannot simultaneously possess the intent 
to kidnap and the intent to kill when performing an act that simultaneously causes the 
detention or restraint and the death. The two mental states are necessarily inconsistent 
and mutually exclusive. 
In the case at bar, when Defendant Simmons hit Arnett with the bat, knocking him 
unconscious, a kidnapping and/or aggravated commenced because that is the act that 
resulted in the detention or restraint of Arnett against his will.4 At that point in time, 
Defendant, as the accomplice of Simmons, must have either intended for Simmons to 
merely knock Arnett unconscious so that they could leave the Academy, or, for Simmons 
to kill Arnett so that they could leave the Academy. Defendant could not have 
simultaneously possessed both the intent to kidnap and the intent to kill. 
Appellants Issue No. 2: "Was there sufficient evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing to support a reasonable belief that the homicide was committed 
while Defendant was engaged in a kidnapping?" 
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Summary of Defendant's Response to Issue No 2: The trial court properly 
found the homicide was not committed while Defendant was engaged in the commission 
of a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping within the meaning of U.C.A. § 76-5-
202(l)(d). Therefore, the trial court properly quashed the bind over order as to the charge 
of aggravated murder. R744:43. This Court should not reverse the trial court. 
First, the State improperly raises new issues for the first time on appeal. The State 
is now contending, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court should have denied the 
Defendant's motion to quash the amended information as to the charge of aggravated 
murder because the kidnapping and/or aggravated kidnapping and the homicide constitute 
a "continuity or action over a span of time" and/or a "continuous interrelated 
transaction." The State did not make this argument below (R174, R738, R477-451); and, 
the State did not raise this particular issue in its "Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order".5 Therefore, the State is precluded from raising this issue for the 
first time on appeal.6 
Second, the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence for the trial court to 
find probable cause to believe Defendant committed the crimes of kidnapping or 
aggravated kidnapping within the meaning of U.C.A §§ 76-5-301 or 76-5-302; and, 
therefore, the aggravating circumstance under U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(d) was not present. 
"State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1981). 
'State v. Lush, 2001 UT 102, If 32, 37 P.3d 1103; State v. Reed, 1999 UT 108,% 9, 992 
P.2d 986; State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 960 (Utah App. 1993) (dissenting opinion). 
"State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, % 7, 44 P.3d 658; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 
1993); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 
(Utah 1983); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1103 (Utah 1994). 
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Third, assuming arguendo the prosecution presented sufficient believable evidence 
•the Defendant committed the crime of kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, the trial 
court properly determined the homicide did not occur while Defendant was engaged in 
the commission of a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping within the meaning of U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-202(1 )(d). The State's argument concerning the close temporal proximity 
between the commission of the kidnapping and/or the aggravated kidnapping is erroneous 
because the kidnapping must be in progress prior to the commission of the act that causes 
the death of another. Otherwise, the act that causes the death does not occur while the 
Defendant is engaged in the commission of the homicide. Hence, Defendant could not 
have been engaged in the commission of a kidnapping because the same act that 
commenced the alleged kidnapping is the same act that caused Arnett's death. 
The State also argues that the homicide occurred while Defendant was engaged in 
the commission of a kidnapping because the homicide was not complete until the 
following day when Arnett died, which is after the kidnapping had commenced. This 
argument is fundamentally flawed for the same reason as set forth immediately above; 
and, because the kidnapping had ended when Arnett was removed the closet. Hence, the 
kidnapping would have concluded prior to the death of Arnett; and, therefore, the 
Defendant would not have been engaged in the commission of& kidnapping when Arnett 
died. 
Fourth, the acts alleged to constitute a kidnapping and/or aggravated kidnapping in 
this case were incidental to and inherent in the commission of the homicide. Every 
homicide necessarily involves a detention or restraint against the will of the victim. 
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However, not every homicide victim is kidnapped. Otherwise, every homicide would 
automatically constitute an aggravated murder pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(d). 
Here, the detention or restraint of Arnett was necessarily inherent in the 
commission of the homicide; and, the movement of Arnett less than three (3) feet after he 
fell to the floor was slight, inconsequential, and incidental to the commission of the 
homicide. Therefore, Defendant carmot be convicted of both murder and kidnapping or 
aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, he should not have been be bound over for both 
murder and kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. 
Appellant's Issue 3: Was there sufficient evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed the 
alternative crime of felony murder? 
Summary of Defendant's Response to Issue No. 3: The trial court was correct 
in not binding Defendant over on a charge of felony murder (U.C.A. § 76-5-203(2)(d)) 
based on its having found the homicide did not occur when Defendant was engaged in 
the commission of a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. R742. The trial court's ruling 
as to the inapplicability of the felony murder rule is consistent with its ruling as to the 
inapplicability of kidnapping or aggravating kidnapping as an aggravating circumstance 
under U.C.A. § 76-5-202(l)(d). 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
STATE'S POINT 1 
A. The State Waived Its Ability to Argue the Issue of Mens Rea for 
Aggravated Murder by Approving the Use of the Term "Specific 
Intent" and by Not Raising the Issue in the Trial Court. 
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The State contends the trial court used the wrong mens rea for aggravated murder 
due to the use of the term "specific intent" in the Order Quashing Amended Information. 
R746-41. The State's contention is without merit for three reasons: (1) the trial court 
applied the correct mens rea for the crime of aggravated murder; (2) the State approved 
the use of the term "specific intent" in order to describe the mens rea for aggravated 
murder, thereby waiving its right to argue this issue on appeal; and, (3) the State did not 
raise this issue in the trial court, thereby waiving its right to argue this issue on appeal. 
1. The trial court applied the correct mens rea. 
In the Order Quashing Amended Information, the trial court actually found "there 
was insufficient evideace presented at the preliminary hearing to sustain a finding there 
was probable cause to believe the Defendant SEAN GRAHAM intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of Anson Arnett within the meaning of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1). 
RV46:45-44, emphasis added. This finding directly conflicts with the State's contention 
the trial could applied an erroneous mental state. Therefore, the State's assertion that trial 
court applied the wrong mens rea is without merit. 
2. The State approved the use of the term "specific intent" and, 
therefore, waived its right to challenge this issue on appeal. 
It is a well settled rule of law that failure to object to a purported error in the trial 
court constitutes a waiver of the objection on appeal. State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, j^ 7, 44 
P.3d 658; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 
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83 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105, 1103 (Utah 1994). 
In addition to using the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" when referring to 
whether Defendant had the intent to kill Arnett, the Order Quashing Amended 
Information also uses the term "specific intent". R746:45-43. The State approved the 
form and content of the Order prior to its having been presented to the trial court for 
signature and filing. R746-41, emphasis added. Furthermore, on November 15, 2005, at 
the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, the State's 
attorney acknowledged that an essential element of aggravated murder is the specific intent 
to kill. R738:5-6. 
The State approved the trial court's use of the term "specific intent" as a term to 
describe the requisite mental state for aggravated murder in the trial court. Therefore, the 
State is precluded from arguing on appeal that the trial court's use of this term was 
erroneous. 
3. The State did not raise the issue as to there being a difference in 
the mens rea for aggravated murder based on the wording U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-202(1) (i.e. "intentionally or knowingly") in the trial court 
and, therefore, the State is precluded from doing so for the first 
time on appeal. 
It is a well settled rule of law that a party will be precluded from raising an issue 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, If 7, 44 P.3d 658; State v. Olsen, 
860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Miller, 61A P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1103 (Utah 1994). 
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On June 9, 2004, a hearing was held at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. 
JR174. At the hearing, the State's attorney acknowledged that in order for the Defendant to 
be bound over for aggravated murder, the State was required to present sufficient, 
believable evidence that Defendant knowingly and intentionally caused the death of 
Arnett. R174:8. 
On November 15, 2005, a hearing was held on Defendant's Motion to Quash the 
Amended Information. R738. At that hearing, the State's attorney acknowledged that an 
essential element of aggravated murder is the specific intent to kill. R738:5-6. 
In the briefs filed by the State in the trial court, the State merely set forth the 
language of the aggravated murder statute. Rl 10-09, R 469-65, 454. The State did not 
argue it had the option of proving one of two different mental states in order to obtain a 
bind over order for aggravated murder. To the contrary, the State acknowledged on 
numerous occasions that for the trial court to issue a bind over order on the charge of 
aggravated murder, the State had to present sufficient evidence the Defendant had the 
specific intent to kill Arnett. 
Despite the foregoing, the State now contends for the first time on appeal, that there 
are two different mental state's that are applicable when a person is charged with 
aggravated murder, to wit, "intentionally" or "knowingly". U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1). 
According to their argument, the term "intentionally", as used in the aggravated murder 
statute, means a defendant willfully engaged in conduct with the conscious objective or 
desire to cause the death of another. U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1). The State also argues that the 
term "knowingly", as used in the aggravated murder statute, means the defendant was 
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aware of the nature of his conduct and the existing circumstance and that his conduct was 
reasonably certain to cause the death of another. U.C.A. § 76-2-103(2). The State further 
contends it is not required to prove a defendant intended to cause the death of another in 
order to obtain a conviction for aggravated murder. The State actually contends that it can 
convict a person of aggravated murder, a capital offense, without proving that the person 
actually intended to kill another person; and, the death penalty can be imposed even though 
a defendant did not possess the subjective intent to kill another person. The State's 
contention is incredible. 
Regardless of the substantive problems inherent in the State's position, the State 
took the opposite position in the trial court, and thereby waived its right to argue this issue 
on appeal; and, this issue was not preserved in the trial court. Therefore, the State is 
precluded from raising this issue on appeal. State v. Jones, 2002 UT 1, ^ 7, 44 P.3d 658; 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 
1988); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 
1103 (Utah 1994). 
B. An Essential Element of Aggravated Murder Is the Intent to Cause the 
Death of Another. 
"Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse 
homicide, homicide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide." U.C.A. § 
76-5-201(2). "A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in 
the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another human being...." U.C.A. § 
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76-5-201(1 )(a)). "Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following 
circumstances:...." U.C.A. §76-5-203(1). "Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an 
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, the actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any 
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;" U.C.A. § 76-5-
203(2) 
The terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" are generically defined in U.C.A. § 76-
2-103(1) and (2), as follows: 
"A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." 
Based on its interpretation of the foregoing statutes, the State contends it is only 
required to prove a person "intentionally or_ knowingly" caused the death of another in 
order to obtain a conviction for aggravated murder. Stated another way, according to the 
State, it is not required to prove the defendant acted both intentionally and knowingly in 
causing the death of another. The State's position is erroneous for several reasons. 
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First, if the State's position were correct, the State would not have to prove the 
defendant acted "intentionally" when engaging in an act that caused the death of another 
in order to obtain a conviction for aggravated murder. The State would only have to 
prove the defendant acted "knowingly" when engaging in an act that caused the death of 
another.8 The State's position is contrary to numerous published appellate cases that 
provide that the State must prove that the defendant "intentionally and knowingly" 
caused the death of another in order to obtain a conviction for aggravated murder. 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1354, (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court of Utah 
explained the critical difference between first and second degree murder is that first 
degree murder requires a "conjoining o f "intentionally and knowingly" with enumerated 
acts, which is not required for second degree murder, as follows: 
"The critical difference between murder in the first and second degrees 
is that the former requires the actor to cause intentionally and 
knowingly the death of another under aggravated circumstances while the 
latter requires an intentional and knowing death or the commission of listed 
acts of aggravation which cause death or recklessness with a depraved 
indifference to human life which eventuates in death. First degree murder 
in brief requires a conjoining of "intentional and knowing" with 
enumerated acts but second degree murder is specified in the 
disjunctive, thereby not requiring this union." Bold and italic emphasis 
added. 
7
 According to the State, "intentionally", within the meaning of the aggravated murder 
statute, means the defendant acted "with a conscious objective or desire to cause the 
death of another." U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1). 
8
 According to the State, "knowingly", as used in the aggravated murder statute, means the 
defendant was aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances and that his 
conduct was reasonably certain to cause the death of another. U.C.A. § 76-2-103(2). 
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In State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah 
. explained that "[f]irst degree murder requires proof of a statutorily defined aggravating 
circumstance in addition to an intentional and knowing killing." Italic emphasis added. 
In State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1215 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court of Utah 
explained that "Section 76-5-202(1 )(q) provides that a knowing and intentional killing is 
first degree murder and is punishable by the death penalty,...." Italic emphasis added. 
In State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court of Utah 
explained that "[s]ection 76-5-202(l)(c) and (d) elevate a knowing and intentional killing 
to first degree murder when:...." Italic emphasis added. Later, in State v. Johnson, 
supra, the Court once again stated that a violation of section 76-5-202(1) requires proof 
of an intentional and knowing killing, as follows: "We disagree, however, with 
defendant's assertion that his conduct did not come within the aggravating circumstances 
described in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(d) (Supp.1986), which elevates a knowing 
and intentional killing to first degree murder if the murder was committed 'while the 
actor was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit... rape ... or aggravated 
sexual assault.'" Italic emphasis added. 
Hence, according to numerous published appellate decisions in Utah, section 76-5-
202(1) requires that a defendant act both intentionally and knowingly when causing the 
death of another in order to be found guilty of aggravated murder.9 
9
 Similarly, in other jurisdictions the critical difference between first degree murder and 
second degree murder is the conscious objective or desire to kill, whether it be labeled as 
intentionally and knowingly, specific intent, premeditation and deliberation, deliberate, 
etc. See Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 669 (Penn. 1986); State v. Reese, 259, 
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Second, if the State's position was correct, in most instances there would be little, 
if any, difference between the crimes of murder and aggravated murder. 
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Utah 1984), the Court analyzed the 
culpable mental state for depraved indifference murder within the meaning of U.C.A. § 
76-5-203(1 )(c) and held the culpable mental state for depraved indifference homicide is 
that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct created a grave risk of death to 
another. Fontana, supra, at pp. 1046-1047. The Court explained the difference between 
first degree murder and depraved indifference second degree murder is that in order to 
be guilty of first degree murder the defendanl must have the "'conscious objective' 
of causing the victim's death." Id. at p. 1047, emphasis added.10 
A proper interpretation of U.C.A. 76-5-202(1) requires that meaning be given to 
both of the words, "intentionally" and "knowingly," without omitting the requirement 
that a person acted with the conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another. 
The word "intentionally", as used in U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1), means a person must act with 
the conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another. The word "knowingly", 
N.W.2d 771, 778 (Iowa 1977); Stokes v. Warden, 306 S.E. 882, 885 (Virginia 1983); 
Terrell v. State, 285 N.W.2d 601, 603; State v. Ferguson, 270 S.E.2d 166, 170 (West 
Virginia 1980); State v. Griffin, 302 S.E.2nd 447, 451 (N. Carolina 1983); State v. 
Valenzuela, 559 P.2d 402, 407 (New Mexico 1976); State v. Marvin, 606 P.2d 406, 408 
Arizona 1980); People v. Sneed, 514 P.2d 776, 778 (Colorado 1973); People v. Vail, 227 
N.W.2d 535, 538 (Michigan 1975); State v. Kerley 696 P.2d 975, 977 (Kansas 1985); 
State v. Seals, 515 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Missouri 1974); State v. Payne, 289 N.W.2d 173, 
177-178 (Nebraska 1980). 
10
 See also State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 1994) [the mens rea required for a 
conviction of depraved indifference murder does not require that the defendant have as 
his conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another; the circumstances under 
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as used in U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1), means that a person must be subjectively aware of the 
.risk posed by the nature of his conduct. Hence, in order to commit the crime of 
aggravated murder a person must be subjectively aware of the grave risk of death posed 
by the nature of his conduct and must act with the conscious objective or desire to cause 
the death of another. A person's awareness of his conduct is critical in that a person must 
subjectively understand, appreciate, and/or comprehend that the conduct in which he is 
engaging in is reasonably certain to accomplish his conscious objective (i.e. the death of 
another). 
If the words "intentionally" and "knowingly", as used in U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1), 
are not read in the conjunctive (as opposed to a disjunctive standard proposed by the 
State), Utah's statutory structure of graded definitions of homicide will no longer exist. 
Based on the State's interpretation of "knowingly", as used in U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1), 
there would be no difference in the mens rea for depraved indifference murder and 
aggravated murder; and, often times there would be no difference between murder as 
defined by U.C.A. § 76-5-203(2)(B) and aggravated murder. The crimes would have the 
same mens rea in that they would, in essence, require that a person knowingly engage in 
conduct that was "reasonably certain" to cause the death of another. 
If the State's position were adopted, the crimes of murder and aggravated murder 
would have an objective, as opposed to a subjective standard, with respect to the 
defendant's mental state. Under depraved indifference murder, the circumstances under 
which the defendant acted are viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable 
person and not subjectively from the state of such defendant's mind]. 
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which the defendant acted are viewed objectively, as opposed to subjectively (Fontana, 
supra, 680 P.2d at p. 1047) and the actual subjective mental state of the defendant is not 
taken into consideration. Ibid. According to the State's interpretation of U.C.A. § 76-5-
202(1), the defendant's subjective mental state would not be taken into consideration for 
aggravated murder either. The State's interpretation of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1), runs 
contrary to the common law meaning of first degree murder, the legislative intent in 
enacting the aggravated murder statutes, and decades of judicial interpretation of Utah's 
first degree murder statutes. Under the common law, the State had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant had the specific intent to kill in order to obtain a 
conviction for first degree murder. State v. Dewey, 111 P. 275, 278-279 (Utah 1912); 
State v. Stenbeck, 2 P.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Utah 1931); State v. Trujillo, 214 P.2d 626, 
633-634 (Utah 1950).11 In State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1327, (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court of Utah used the term "specific intent" when describing the requisite 
mens rea that a defendant must possess in order to be found guilty of first degree murder. 
Furthermore, if the State's disjunctive interpretation of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1) were 
correct, the word "intentionally" in the statute would be mere surplusage in that the 
State's interpretation of the word "knowingly" creates a much lower standard of proof. 
The State would no longer need to prove that the murder was committed "intentionally", 
it would merely have to prove that the murder was committed "knowingly." 
Criminal statutes are to be construed in light of the background rules of the common 
law in which the requirement of mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded. Staples v. 
U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-
437(1978). 
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In State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 548, 559 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court of Utah 
explained "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of due process that '[n]o one may be required at 
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes."' Egbert, 
supra, 748 P.2d at p. 559, quoting U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). This 
fundamental principal applies to substantive provisions of criminal statutes. Ibid. "A 
criminal statute is therefore invalid if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." Ibid. 
In Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972), the United States 
Supreme Court explained that vague criminal statutes violate basic principles of due 
process, as follows: 
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend 
several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 
so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application." 
In State v. Tuttle, supra, 780 P.2d at 1216-1217 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court 
of Utah explained that the 8th and 14th Amendments to the federal constitution require 
every state to "define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that 
obviates standardless discretion." These criminal statutes must provide a "meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the 
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many cases in which it is not." Id. at p. 1216. If a statutory scheme does not provide "a 
meaningful distinction between capital and noncapital murders", the statutory scheme 
will be unconstitutional under the federal constitution. Id. at p. 1217. 
In State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,1f 48, 52 P.3d 1194, 1206, the Supreme Court 
of Utah explained that criminal laws must be written so there are significant differences 
between offenses and so that the same conduct is not subject to different penalties 
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depending upon which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. 
Under the State's interpretation, a person of ordinary intelligence is not able to 
understand the difference between depraved indifference murder and aggravated murder. 
Further, a person of ordinary intelligence is not given a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited under the aggravated murder statute, so that he may act accordingly. 
Additionally, the State's interpretation of the aggravated murder statute does not provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them. To the contrary, under the State's 
interpretation, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries would be able to decide who will be 
prosecuted for aggravated murder, as opposed to depraved indifference murder, on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application. Finally, Defendant contends the State's interpretation of the means rea 
12
 In People v. Marcy, 628, P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1981), the Supreme Court of Colorado 
explained that criminal statues are required to provide an adequate definition of the act 
and mental state of each offense so that fair warning if given to all person concerning the 
nature of proscribed conduct and the penalties therefore. Furthermore, criminal statutes 
are required to differentiate on reasonable grounds the more serious from the less serious 
criminal conduct and prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offense. Ibid. The equal protection clause of the 14* Amendment to the United States 
Constitution mandates a rationale and even handed application of the law. Ibid. 
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requirement of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1) fails to provide a meaningful distinction between 
.murder and aggravated murder and, therefore, the State's interpretation would necessarily 
result in a finding that Utah's aggravated murder statute is unconstitutional. Tuttle, 
supra, 780P.2datpp. 1216-1217. 
This Court is required to interpret the aggravated murder statute in a manner that is 
consistent with state and federal law in order to avoid striking it down as 
unconstitutional. Tuttle, supra, 780 P.2d at p. 1217. The only manner in which the 
aggravated murder statute can be interpreted in order to avoid striking it down is to 
require the State to prove a defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of 
another (in addition to the presence of a valid aggravating circumstance). 
C. In Order to Convict a Defendant of Aggravated Murder Based on 
Accomplice Liability, the State Must Prove that the Accomplice 
Specifically Intended the Principal to Cause the Death of Another. 
The State contends when prosecuting a defendant for aggravated murder, it has the 
option of proving a defendant acted either ^intentionally or knowingly" when causing the 
death of another. According to the State, the words "intentionally or_ knowingly" are 
disjunctive, and therefore proof of either will satisfy a conviction for aggravated murder. 
The State cites State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106, in support of its 
position. In Casey, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah held in order to prove the crime 
of attempted murder the prosecution must prove the defendant had a specific intent 
to kill Casey, supra, 2003 UT 55, Tf 23. In so holding, the Court analyzed the attempt 
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statute (76-4-101) in conjunction with the second degree murder statute (76-5-203)(2)(a). 
The Court was not analyzing the aggravated murder statute. 
Furthermore, when Casey was decided, the attempt statute provided "a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the offense." Casey, supra, 2003 UT 55, f^ 18, fn. 
5; State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982).13 The Court explained the statutes 
required the prosecution prove the defendant had a specific intent to kill in order to be 
found guilty of attempted murder because "there can be no difference between the intent 
required as an element of the crime of attempted first degree murder and that required for 
first degree murder itself." Casey, supra, 2003 UT 55, ]f 18, fn. 5; Maestas, supra, 652 
P.2d at p. 904. 
In the case at bar, Defendant is accused of being an accomplice to aggravated 
murder. The accomplice statute (U.C.A. § 76-2-202) requires a mens rea that is very 
similar to the mens rea required for the crime of "'attempt. The accomplice liability 
statute provides, as follows: 
"Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct." U.C.A. § 76-2-202, bold and underline emphasis added. 
u
 U.C.A. § 76-4-101 was amended effective May 3, 2004. See Laws 2004, c. 154, § 1, 
eff. May 3, 2004. 
- 2 7 -
However, the accomplice liability statute specifically requires the defendant not 
.only act with the mental state required for the commission of the underlying offense, it 
also requires that a person "intentionally" aid another. Therefore, the argument for 
specific intent in the context of this case (where the accomplice liability statute 
specifically requires the defendant intentionally aid another) is more compelling than the 
circumstances present in Maestas, supra, or Casey, supra. 
According to the State, Defendant is liable as an accomplice under U.C.A. § 76-2-
202 for the murder of Arnett, which was committed by Defendant Simmons. The State 
further contends that Defendant aided Simmons in that he signaled to Simmons when 
Arnett was ascended the stairs. However, the State was required to present sufficient 
evidence from which the trial court could-find that Defendant had a conscious objective 
or desire that Simmons kill Arnett by striking him with the bat (i.e. "intentionally"); and, 
that Defendant had a conscious objective or desire that his signaling Simmons would aid 
Simmons in causing the death of Arnett (i.e. purposefully). In the absence of such 
evidence, the Defendant can not be bound over as n accomplice. 
D. The Prosecution Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence that Defendant 
Possessed the Intent to Cause the Death of Arnett 
It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove by way of direct evidence that the 
defendant had the intent to kill. State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1983). The 
defendant's intent can be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. 
Ibid. However, a defendant can intend to cause serious bodily injury to another without 
intending to cause death. State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Utah 1976). 
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In the case at bar, the trial court correctly found the prosecution did not present 
sufficient, believable evidence the Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of Amett. R746:45-744. The court found there was both direct and circumstantial 
evidence in support of its finding. R746:45-44. 
The direct evidence was a statement made by Defendant at the scene of the 
incident, to wit, "Why didn't you knock him out the first time?" R 169:27. The trial court 
correctly found this statement was direct evidence of Defendant's state of mind and was 
subject to only one reasonable inference, to wit, Defendant did not intend to cause the 
death of Arnett. R745-744. Defendant did not ask Simmons why he did not kill Amett 
the first time he struck him; and, Defendant did not tell Simmons to hit Arnett harder the 
next time. The State's interpretation of Defendant's statement is unreasonable. The trial 
court was not willing to make unreasonable and illogical inferences from the evidence. 
Additionally, the trial court found the circumstantial evidence leads to an inference 
that the Defendant did not intend to cause the death of Arnett, to wit: (1) the two blows 
were not struck in repeated or rapid succession; and, (2) after Arnett was incapacitated 
Defendant did not engage in any further activity to ensure the death of Arnett. 
Contrary to the statements contained within the State's brief, there was no 
evidence presented by the State the placement of Arnett in the closet either caused or 
contributed to the cause of his death. R169. Moreover, there was no evidence presented 
by the State to the effect that had Arnett immediately received medical attention he would 
not have died as a result of his injuries. R169. Hence, the State's arguments concerning 
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the placement and locking of Arnett in the closet and the cutting of the phone lines are 
irrelevant. 
Contrary to the State's assertions, the trial court correctly bound over Defendant 
on charges of second degree murder based on section 76-5-203(2)(b) and (c); and, not on 
charges of aggravated murder. The trial court made the only logical and reasonable 
inference it could from the evidence, to wit, Defendant did not possess the intent to kill. 
STATE'S POINT 2 
A. The Homicide Was Not Committed While Defendant Was Engaged in 
the Commission of a Kidnapping or Aggravated Kidnapping Within 
the Meaning of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(l)(d). 
The State contends the trial court erred when it found that U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(d) 
did not apply to the facts of this case because the homicide did not occur while the 
Defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. 
More specifically, the State contends the court overlooked the fact that while the fatal 
blows were struck before the kidnapping has commenced and the homicide was not 
complete until Arnett died. Appellant's Brief, p. 23. Therefore, according to the State, 
the homicide occurred while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of a 
kidnapping. The State relies on State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1993) and State 
v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987) in support of its position. 
Of significance, the State acknowledges neither a kidnapping nor an aggravated 
kidnapping where in progress at the time that Simmons struck Arnett with the bat. 
There are two fundamental problems with the State's position. First, based on the 
plain language of the aggravated murder statute, the statutorily enumerated felony (i.e. 
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kidnapping and/or aggravated kidnapping) must be in progress at the time of the 
commission of the act that causes the death of another. Second, the act that caused the 
death of Arnett occurred simultaneously with the act that commenced the alleged 
kidnapping, which is an inherent conflict in the requisite mental state for the crimes of 
aggravated murder and kidnapping, such that the Defendant can only intend to kill or 
kidnap Arnett, he cannot intend to do both. Consequently, the trial court was either 
required to find that Defendant had the intent to kill or he had the intent to kidnap. 
1. The kidnapping must be in progress at the time that the 
defendant commits the act that causes the death of another. 
In State v. Gernionto, 2003 UT App. 217, U 6, 73 P.3d 978, the Court set forth the 
rules of statutory construction, as follows: 
"In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of the statute. 
[Citation omitted.] In considering the plain language of a statute, courts 
'presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to 
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.' [Citations 
omitted.] We consider other methods of statutory construction only when a 
statute is ambiguous." 
The statute, U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(d), is not ambiguous and, therefore, it should be 
interpreted considering its plain language. In looking at its plain language, it is evident 
that a homicide must occur while the defendant is engaged in the commission of a 
kidnapping. When comparing subdivision (l)(d) of the aggravated murder statute 
(U.C.A. § 76-5-202) with subdivision (2)(d) of the second degree felony murder statute 
(U.C.A. § 76-5-203), it is apparent that the italicized language "the homicide was 
committed while the actor is engaged in the commission of is not present in the felony 
murder statute. This is significant because when this Court analyzes the aggravated 
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murder statute, it is required to "'presume that the legislature used each word advisedly 
and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. 
Germonto, 2003 UT App. 217, ^ 6, 73 P.3d 978. Therefore, it must be presumed the 
legislature intended to differentiate subdivision (l)(d) of the aggravated murder statute 
(U.C.A. § 76-5-202) from subdivision (2)(d) of the felony murder statute (U.C.A. § 76-5-
203), by including the language "the homicide was committed while the actor is engaged 
in the commission of in the aggravated murder statute. The logical and reasonable 
inference for the inclusion of the additional language within the aggravated murder 
statute was that the legislature intended to create a temporal requirement with respect to 
the commission of the murder. The purpose of which would be to narrow the class of 
persons who could be convicted of aggravated murder and thereby subject to life 
imprisonment or the death penalty. 
The cases relied upon by the State {State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1993), 
and State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987)) in support of its position are 
inapposite. 
In State v. Archuleta, supra, 850 P.2d 1232, defendants (Archuleta and Wood) 
physically assaulted their victim, Church, and then bound him with tire chains and a 
bungee cord {Id. at p. 1236) and placed him in the truck of his own car. Ibid. Archuleta 
and Wood then proceeded to drive north from Cedar City toward Salt Lake City on 
Interstate 15. Ibid. After driving approximately 76 miles with Church in the trunk of the 
car, defendants pulled off the highway into a secluded area. Ibid. After removing him 
from the trunk, they attached battery cables to his testicles and to the car battery. Ibid. 
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They beat Church severely on the head with a tire jack and tire iron (Ibid) and then 
inserted a tire iron into his rectum, forcing it eighteen inches into his body and puncturing 
his liver. Ibid. When Church was apparently dead, the defendants dragged his body up a 
hillside and attempted to cover his body with tree branches and dirt. Ibid. Church died 
as a result of a brain injury. Ibid. 
A jury convicted defendant Archuleta of aggravated murder (Id. at p. 1235) and 
found the existence of the following aggravating circumstances: (1) kidnapping; (2) 
aggravated kidnapping; (3) object rape; and, (4) the homicide was committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner. Id. at p. 1235. 
The defendant appealed his conviction. One of the issues on appeal was whether the jury 
was properly instructed on the definition of "in the commission o f as set forth in U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-202(1 )(d). Id. at p. 1244. The jury was provided with a definition of "in the 
commission o f which read, as follows: 
"The phrase 'in the commission of denotes a continuing chain of events. 
When there is close proximity in terms of time and distance between the 
aggravating circumstances and the homicide and there is no break in the 
chain of events from the inception of the aggravating circumstances to the 
homicide, the events are considered one continuous transaction." Id. at p. 
1244. 
Archuleta claimed the jury instruction was incorrect because "it failed to instruct 
the jury that if it found that any of the criminal acts inflicted on the victim were 
completed before the intent to commit the homicide was formed, then those offenses 
cannot be aggravating circumstances under section 76-2-202(1 )(d)." Id. at p. 1244. The 
Court disagreed with Archuleta and held the jury instruction was proper in that it was 
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consistent with the Court's decision in State v. Johnson, supra, 740 P.2d 1264. 
Archuleta, supra, 850 P.2d at pp. 1244-1245. In so holding, the Court explained the 
phrase "while committing" denotes a continuing chain of events from the inception of the 
felony to the time of the homicide, as follows: 
"T]he phrase 'while committing9 denotes a continuing chain of events.... In 
other words, when there is a close proximity in terms of time and distance 
between the underlying felony and the homicide and there is no break in 
the chain of events from the inception of the felony to the time of the 
homicide, we treat the two events as part of one continuous transaction." 
Id. at p. 1245, bold and underline emphasis added. 
The Court further explained "[sjection 76-5-202(l)(d) requires only that the 
defendant intentionally cause the death of the victim." Id. at p. 1245, bold and 
underline emphasis added. 
Archuleta, silpra, actually supports the Defendant's contention because the Court 
found that the chain of events begins with the "inception of the felony" which means the 
felony must be in progress when the homicide is committed. The State's contention that 
the homicide was not completed until Amett died and, therefore, the kidnapping had 
commenced is not supported by Archuleta, supra, or Johnson, supra. These cases 
analyze situations where the defendant commits the act that causes the death of another 
after the felony was already in progress. 
2. The felony murder rule does not apply in this case. 
14
 Similarly, in State v. Johnson, supra, 740 P.2d at pp. 1267-1268, the Court found that 
if "there is no break in the chain of events from the inception of the felony to the time of the 
homicide, we treat the two events as part of one continuous transaction." 
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The State contends that the trial court erred in refusing to bind Defendant over 
under the felony murder rule based on its having erroneously concluded that the 
kidnapping must have been in progress at the time that the murder occurred. The felony 
murder rule requires that "the actor is engaged in the commission ... of any predicated 
offense..." and "a person other than a party ... is killed in the course of the commission 
of... any predicate offense." U.C.A. § 76-5-203(2)(d)(ii). Hence, a person must be 
killed after the predicate offense has already commenced in order for the felony murder 
rule to apply. Therefore, the State's contention is erroneous for the same reasons 
articulated hereinabove with respect to the inapplicability of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(d). 
3. The mens rea required for kidnapping necessarily conflicts with 
the mens rea for aggravated murder. 
The State's brief does not address an important issue that was argued in the trial 
court, to wit, the act that caused the death of Amett occurred simultaneously with the act 
that commenced the alleged kidnapping; and, there is an inherent conflict in the requisite 
mental state for the crimes of aggravated murder and kidnapping. 
Aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping are all specific intent 
crimes. U.C.A. §§ 767-5-202, 76-5-301, 76-5-302. Each crime requires the defendant 
consciously desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result, to wit, death or a 
detention or restraint, respectively. Furthermore, it is well settled law that "[a] 
kidnapping begins when the detention begins to be 'against the will of the victim." State 
v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1981). 
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Under the circumstances of this case, the Defendant could not simultaneously 
.possess both the "intent to kidnap" and the "intent to kill." R529:525-523. The "intent to 
kidnap" necessarily entails an intent to keep the victim alive, at least for a brief period of 
time. Conversely, the "intent to kill" entails a conscious desire to cause death. Hence, 
the mental states are contradictory, inconsistent, and/or mutually exclusive. In the case at 
bar, the State contends Defendant "intended to kill" Amett when Simmons hit him with 
the baseball bat. However, the act that caused the death of Arnett simultaneously 
commenced the alleged kidnapping. Therefore, at that point in time, Defendant either 
intended to kidnap or kill Arnett, he could not simultaneously intend to do both. 
The trial court acknowledged the foregoing argument was correct at the hearing on 
Defendant's motion to quash (R738:20) and explained the kidnapping must have already 
been in progress at the time Arnett was struck with the bat in order for section 76-5-
202(l)(d) to apply. R738:20. Otherwise, the intent to kill would directly conflict with 
the intent to kidnap; the Defendant could not simultaneously possess the intent to kill and 
the intent to kidnap; and, therefore the court would have to find that the Defendant did 
not have the intent to kill. R738:20. 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by Cross-Appellant/Defendant Sean Graham are as follows: 
Issue No, 1: Was sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to 
support a reasonable belief the defendant committed the crime of kidnapping. 
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Standard of Review: "The determination of whether to bind a criminal 
defendant over for trial is a question of law" (State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ]f 8, 20 P.3d 
300), which is reviewed "without deference to the Court below." State v. Schroyer, 2002 
UT 26, t 8, 44 P.3d 730. "Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104 [...] requires that the provisions 
of the code be interpreted so that the elements of a crime are clearly defined." State v. 
Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, U 17, 73 P.3d 978. "[The] United States Supreme Court 
has directed that "'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved 
in favor of lenity.9 State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, f 18, 99 P.3d 359. Thus, 
"'[wjhen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, 
we are to choose the harsher only when [the Legislature] has spoken in clear and definite 
language.'" 76zV/. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R101:16-21; 23-28; 32-34. 
Issue No, 2: Is the "other personal gain" portion of U.C.A § 76-5-202(l)(g) 
unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied? 
Standard of Review: The standards of review are the same as Issue No. 1. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R101:30; R142:13-20. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cross-Appellant's Issue No. 1: A Defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping 
for conduct traditionally considered to be an integral element of another crime. The 
detention, restraint, and/or movement of Amett must be more than slight, inconsequential 
and merely incidental to the homicide. Mere incidental restraint and movement during 
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the course of a homicide are not, standing alone, indicia of a true kidnapping otherwise 
every murder would automatically constitute aggravated murder. 
Cross-Appellant's Issue No. 2. The portion of the aggravated murder statute 
that elevates a crime from murder to aggravated murder based on a finding that the 
defendant committed the murder for "other personal gain" (U.C.A. § 76-5-202(f)) is 
unconstitutional because it: (1) fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; (2) it impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to prosecutors, policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis;15 and, (3) it does not provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing 
those few cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the cases in which it is not.16 
ARGUMENT 
Cross-Appellant's Issue No. 1: Was sufficient evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing to support a finding of probable cause to believe that the 
Defendant committed the crime of kidnapping? 
Defendant contends in order to be bound over for kidnapping or aggravated 
kidnapping, the trial court was required to find the detention, restraint, and/or movement 
of Arnett was more than slight, inconsequential, and/or merely incidental to the 
15
 State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, \ 11, 73 P.3d 978, 980-981; Groyned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
16
 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 
423-424 (D.Utah 1984). 
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homicide.17 There are no cases in Utah that address this issue. Consequently, Defendant 
has provided this Court with pertinent authority from other jurisdictions. 
In State v. Green, supra, 94 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628,19 the defendant was 
convicted of kidnapping and murder. The kidnapping elevated the crime of murder to 
aggravated murder. The restraint and/or movement of the victim was "estimated 
variously by the prosecuting attorney as from 20 to 50 feet." {Id., at 635.) The 
Washington Supreme Court concluded: "[Although appellant lifted and moved the 
victim to the apartment's exterior loading area, it is clear these events were actually an 
integral part of and not independent of the underlying homicide." Ibid. "While 
movement of the victim occurred, the mere incidental restraint and movement of a 
victim which might occur during the course of a homicide are not, standing alone, 
17
 See State v. Green, 616 P.2d 628 (Wash. 1980); State v. Saunders, 86 P.3d 232, 241, 
(Wash. App. 2004); State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 166, 892 P.2d 29 (1995); (State v. 
Vernon, 867 P.2d 407 (N.M. 1993); State v. Korum, 86 P.3d 166, 173-174; State v. Innis, 
433 A.2d 646, 655 (R.I. 1981); Alam v. State, 776 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1989); State v. 
McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 660 (Alaska 1994); State v. Rich, 305 N.W. 739 (Iowa 1981); 
State v. McGrew, 515 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 1994); State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108 (Maine 
1980); Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 (Nevada 1978); Hampton v. Clark County Sheriff, 
591 P.2d 1146 (Nevada 1979); State v. Fulcher, 243 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1978); State v. 
Beatty, 495 S.E. 367 (N.C. 1998); State v. Logan, 397 N.E. 1345 (Ohio 1979); State v. 
Curtis, 298 M.W.2d 807 (S.D. 1980); State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (TN. 1991); 
State v. Miller, 336 S.E. 910 (Va. 1985). 
1 O 
When Utah is devoid of authority on a particular issue, it is appropriate to seek 
guidance from other jurisdictions. State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, |^ 15, 531; State v. 
WanosiK 2003 UT 4 6 , \ 23, 79 P.3d 937; State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, \ 12 ,999 P2d 565; 
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (UT App 1998). 
19
 State v. Green, supra, 616 P.2d 628 was cited by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Russell 733 P.2d 162, 167 (UT 1987) as authority on the issue of a defendant's right to 
jury unanimity as to which category of crime he committed. Hence, the Supreme Court 
of Utah is aware of decision in State v. Green, supra, 616 P.2d 628 and relied on it in 
support its holding on a different issue. 
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indicia of a true kidnapping." Ibid. The Green, supra, court further explained "under 
the kidnapping statute a movement of the victim does not constitute an asportation 
unless it has significance independent of the assault." Id. at p. 636. "And, unless the 
victim is removed from the environment where he is found, the consequences of the 
movement itself to the victim are not independently significant from the assault - the 
movement does not manifest the commission of a separate crime." Ibid. "'Restraint' by 
an ultimate killing does not, in and of itself, establish kidnapping." Ibid. "[The 
kidnapping statute] contemplates employment of a deadly force that stops short of actual 
homicide." Ibid. "When the State establishes a killing it may have proved a homicide 
or some other crime, but it has not established kidnapping." Ibid. "In the broadest sense 
the infliction of a fatal wound is the ultimate form of 'restraint' because it obviously 
'restrict(s) a person's movements . . . in a manner which interferes substantially with (the 
person's) liberty.'" Ibid. "If such logic is applied to the law of kidnapping, [...] every 
intentional killing would also be a kidnapping because the killing itself would supply the 
requisite 'restraint' (i.e., the killing being the ultimate form of restraint)." Ibid. 
Moreover, every intentional killing would automatically become murder in the first 
degree." Ibid. 
In discussing the intent behind the initiative, the court stated, "the initiative 
carefully set out seven specific circumstances in which a first degree murder could be 
elevated into a crime punishable by death." Ibid. "It did not, either specifically or by 
inference, indicate that its purpose was to automatically convert every intentional killing 
into aggravated murder in the first degree punishable by death." Ibid. "Thus, we are 
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compelled to conclude evidence of the killing itself does not establish the 'restraint' 
necessary to prove kidnapping based on restraint by the use of deadly force." Ibid. 
In State v. Saunders, 120 Wash.App. 800, 86 P.3d 232, 241 (Wash. App. 2004), 
the court did not apply the rule as set forth in Green, supra, because under the facts and 
circumstances before it the kidnapping was not incidental to the rape because acts of the 
defendant were above and beyond the conduct required or even typical in the 
commission of rape. It explained the concept of one crime being merely incidental 
to another originates from the merger doctrine case law but it is separate and 
distinct. State v. Saunders, supra, 86 P.3d at p. 241. '"[E]vidence of restraint and 
movement merely incidental to a homicide is insufficient to establish kidnapping as an 
element of the murder.' [State v. Harris, 36 Wash.App. 746, 752, 677 P.2d 202 
(Wash. 1984).]" State v. Saunders, supra, 86 P.3d at p. 241. xTo determine whether a 
crime is incidental to the 'actual crime charged,' the court must look to 'the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the crime and the nature of the acts and their relation to the 
crime." Id. at p. 242. 'The merger doctrine prevents 'pyramiding the charges.'" Ibid. 
'The doctrine applies where 'the Legislature has clearly indicated that in order to prove 
a particular degree of crime (e.g., first degree rape) the State must prove not only that a 
defendant committed that crime (e.g., rape) but that the crime was accompanied by an 
act [that] is defined as a crime elsewhere in the criminal statutes (e.g., assault or 
kidnapping).'" Ibid. "'Merger applies 'only when a crime is elevated to a higher degree 
by proof of another crime proscribed elsewhere in the criminal code.'" Id., at 243. 
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In State v. Korum, 120 Wash.App. 686, 86 P.3d 166, 173-174, (Wash. App., 
2004), the Court of Appeals of Washington applied the rule set forth in State v. Green, 
supra, in a case where the defendant was convicted of robberies and kidnapping. The 
Court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of kidnapping 
because the restraint and movement of the victim was merely incidental to the robberies. 
In State v. Vernon, 116 N.M. 737, 867 P.2d 407, 411 (N.M., 1993), the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico followed the holding and rationale of State v. Green, supra, 616 
P.2d at pp. 636-637. In reversing the defendant's conviction the Court stated: "We 
agree, however, with the holding of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Green, 
[...] that 'the mere incidental restraint and movement of a victim which might occur 
during the course of a homicide are not, -standing alone, indicia of a true kidnapping.' 
Id, at p, 635, underline emphasis added. "Vernon may well have thought that killing 
Stevens would be to his benefit and that it would be better to kill him in a location where 
there would be fewer witnesses than at the 7-11." Id, at p. 411. "Still, whatever benefit 
Vernon saw in taking Stevens to a remote location, the movement was merely incidental 
to the murder." Id, at p. 411, underline emphasis added. "If we accept the State's 
construction of the kidnapping statute, then we effectively would allow any murder 
when there is incidental movement of the victim to be punishable as first-degree murder, 
even without proof of premeditation or perpetration of a felony." Id, at p. 411. "In 
essence, we would allow the State to convict a defendant of kidnapping simply by 
proving that the defendant committed a murder and that the defendant moved the 
victim." Ibid, "The legislature, however, did not intend that this scenario be construed 
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as kidnapping, as evidenced by the specific enumeration of elements in our kidnapping 
statute." Ibid. 
In State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646 (R.I., 1981), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
reversed a conviction for kidnapping and held the confinement and asportation of a cab 
driver had no significance independent of being robbed and murdered. "The true test in 
each case is not mere mileage but whether the movements of the victim 'substantially 
increase the risk of harm5 beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery itself. [California 
citations omitted]." Id.9 at p. 654. According to the Innis, supra, court: "The history of 
our statute and the experience of other jurisdictions suggest that conduct that was 
traditionally considered to be an integral element of another crime cannot be punished as 
kidnapping." Id., at p. 655. "[T]he kidnapping statute should only be applied to 
'conventional' kidnappings." Ibid., underline emphasis added. "To apply the wording 
of the statute in a literal manner would run the risk of kidnapping convictions based on 
trivial changes in location having 'no bearing on the evil at hand.'" Ibid. "[A] 
confinement or imprisonment must have some independent significance." Ibid. "Thus, 
any movement of a victim during the course of a crime cannot be punished as a 
kidnapping unless such movement exceeds that necessary to facilitate the crime at 
hand." Ibid. 
In 1969, the California Supreme Court reconsidered the degree of asportation 
needed to sustain a kidnapping conviction and held: "[W]hen in the course of a robbery 
a defendant does no more than move his victim around inside the premises in which he 
finds him - whether it be a residence, as here, or a place of business or other enclosure -
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his conduct generally will not be deemed to constitute the offense [of kidnapping for 
ransom, reward, extortion, rape, or robbery; punishment]." People v. Daniels, 71 CaL2d 
1119, 1140, 459 P.2d 225, 238 (Cal. 1969). 
Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
and West Virginia have also adopted the foregoing rule of law.20 
Here, the undisputed facts are that Arnett: (1) was hit in the head with a bat by 
Simmons on two completely separate and distinct occasions; (2) was knocked 
unconscious by the second blow to the head; (3) was not moved or confined until after he 
received the second blow to the head when he was placed in a closet that was less than 
three feet from where he fell to the floor; (4) never regained consciousness; and, (5) his 
death was caused by blunt force trauma to the head. There was absolutely no evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing that the placement of Arnett's body in the closet in 
any way caused or contributed to his death. R169. 
The act restraint, detention, and subsequent movement of Arnett less than three (3) 
feet from where he fell to the floor, was purely incidental or subsidiary to the homicide 
and was an integral part of the homicide. State v. Green, 95 Wash.2d 216, 616 P.2d at 
20
 See Alam v. State, 776 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1989); State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 660 
(Alaska 1994); State v. Rich, 305 N.W. 739 (Iowa 1981); State v. McGrew, 515 N.W.2d 
36 (Iowa 1994); State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108 (Maine 1980); Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 
442 (Nevada 1978); Hampton v. Clark County Sheriff, 591 P.2d 1146 (Nevada 1979); 
State v. Fulcher, 243 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1978); State v. Beatty, 495 S.E. 367 (N.C. 1998); 
State v. Logan, 397 N.E. 1345 (Ohio 1979); State v. Curtis, 298 M.W.2d 807 (S.D. 
1980); State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tn. 1991); State v. Miller, 336 S.E. 910 (VA. 
1985). 
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628, 635 (Wash. 1980). Siunce the restraint/detention and/or movement of Arnett had no 
significance independent of the homicide, no kidnapping occurred. Ibid. 
Cross-Appellant's Issue No. 2: Is the "other personal gain" portion of U.C.A 
§ 76-5-202(l)(f) unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied? 
Defendant contends the portion of the aggravated murder statute that elevates a 
crime from murder to aggravated murder on the basis of "other personal gain" (U.C.A. § 
76-5-202(f)) is unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad because it: (1) fails to provide 
a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; (2) 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to prosecutors, policemen, judges, and 
9 I 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis; and, (3) does not provide a 
meaningful basis for distinguishing those few cases in which the death penalty is imposed 
99 
from the many cases in which it is not. 
In Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 424 (D.C. Utah 1984), an issue before the 
District Court was the constitutionality of the portion of Utah's aggravated murder statute 
that elevates a crime from murder to aggravated murder if the murder is committed by the 
defendant for "other personal gain". U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(g). Therein, the District Court 
explained that "[a] capital sentencing system must provide a 'meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not."' Andrews v. Shulsen, supra, 600 F.Supp. at p. 424. "This means that if a 
21
 State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, % 11, 73 P.3d 978, 980-981; Groyned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
22
 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F.Supp. 408, 
423-424 (D.Utah 1984). 
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state wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor 
and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the 
death penalty." Ibid. "Part of a state's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes 
for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing] 
discretion.'" Ibid. "It must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective 
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance/ and that 'make rationally 
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Ibid. 
Therein, the District Court held that the aggravating circumstance of killing for 
personal gain, as further defined by the instruction presented to the sentencing authority 
in that case, satisfied the foregoing rules. Ibid. According to the District Court, the 
other personal gain circumstance provided a meaningful standard for distinguishing those 
cases where the death penalty may be imposed and it contained a clear and objective and 
makes the process rationally reviewable. 
The fundamental problem with the District Court's opinion in Shulsen, supra, is 
the court did not engage in its own analysis of this issue. Instead, the District Court 
relied on the principal enunciated in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 889, fn. 25 (1983), 
to wit, even if an aggravating circumstance is constitutionally deficient, the ultimate 
result is unaffected where the death sentence is support by the finding of at least one 
other aggravating circumstance. Shulsen, supra, 600 F.Supp. at p. 424. In Shulsen, supra, 
the jury found five (5) other aggravating circumstances to be true. Ibid. Therefore, the 
District Court did not need to analyze this issue. 
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In State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 395 984 P.2d 382, the defendant contended that 
the "other personal gain" aggravating circumstance was facially vague and overbroad. 
Ibid. The Court found that the "other personal gain" aggravating circumstance was 
constitutional on its face. Ibid. However, the Court relied exclusively on Andrews v. 
Shulsen, supra, 600 F.Supp. 408, 424. The problem with the Court's reliance on 
Andrews v. Shulsen, supra, is that the District Court never analyzed the issue because 
there were other aggravating factors present. In Lovell, supra, 119 UT 40, *|f 39, the Court 
merely referred to the definition of "other personal gain" that was purportedly found 
acceptable by the District Court in Andrews v. Shulsen, supra, to wit, "killing so as to 
gain a substantial advantage or to rid oneself of substantial difficulty [such as] to silence 
a witness." Lovell, supra, 119 UT 40, f 39. In Lovell, supra, there were at least two 
other aggravating factors present and, therefore, the constitutionality of the "other 
personal gain" language contained within 76-5-202(g) was not as important as it would 
have been had it been the only aggravating factor present. Ibid. Consequently, the Court 
summarily dealt with the issue. Ibid. 
15
 In State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986), the defendant contended that the 
"other personal gain" portion of the aggravated murder statute (U.C.A. § 76-5-202) was 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 9 of the Utah Constitution. The Court did not 
address the constitutionality of the "other personal gain" aggravating circumstance 
because the defendant was also found guilty of aggravated robbery, which was also the 
basis for a separate and distinct aggravating circumstance pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-
202(l)(d). Id. at p. 1307. Consequently, the Court did not address the constitutionality of 
"other personal gain." Ibid. 
Similarly, in State v. Young, 853, P.2d 327, 336-338 (Utah 1993), the defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of the "pecuniary or other personal gain" aggravating 
circumstance contained with the aggravated murder statute. U.C.A. § 76-5-202. In 
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Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erroneously found the murder was 
committed for "other personal gain"; (2) this aggravating factor is unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied; (3) the statute is void for vagueness since it does not provide a 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what it prohibited; and, 
(4) the statute impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to prosecutors, policemen, 
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Defendant further contends the 
"other person gain" statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is because it does 
not sufficiently narrow the class of persons that are eligible to receive the death penalty; 
and, nearly every intentional homicide could be viewed in some manner as having been 
committed for some personal gain thereby subjecting the perpetrator to the death penalty. 
"A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails to provide a 'person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.'; (2) 
'impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application...." Germonto, supra, 2003 UT App 217, f 11; Grayned, 
supra, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09. 
Young, supra, 853 P.2d at p. 337, the jury found two aggravating circumstances under 
U.C.A. § 76-5-202(d) and (f) [now (g)]. Ibid. The Court found that the "pecuniary or 
other personal gain" subdivision was no unconstitutional because the defendant had 
reasonable notice that this subdivision applied to killing the victim and taking her purse, 
money, credit cards, etc. Ibid. The Court further found that even if the "pecuniary or 
other person gain" subdivision was unconstitutional, any error was harmless due to the 
presence of the aggravating circumstance under subdivision (d). Ibid. 
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In the case at bar, "at the end of the day" the "other personal gain" aggravating 
circumstance may be the only basis for elevating the crime of murder to aggravated 
murder. Consequently, the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance may be of 
utmost importance in this case. The relative importance of this issue will depend on how 
the Court decides on other issues that are currently before the Court in this appeal. 
The "other personal gain" portion of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(g), is so vague and 
ambiguous that it could literally be applied in every homicide because the defendant will 
invariably gain something from having committed the homicide. The "other personal 
gain" portion of U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(g) does not provide notice of what is prohibited 
and it allows prosecutors, judges and juries to apply this circumstance on an ad hoc basis. 
Defendant also contends that this subdivision is unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
The District Court found the "other personal gain" obtained by the Defendant as a result 
of the homicide was that the Defendant was able to leave the Academy. However, no 
evidence was presented that Arnett was killed because the Defendant wanted to "gain a 
substantial advantage" or "rid himself of a substantial difficulty". 
Defendant further contends the specific aggravating circumstance in U.C.A. § 76-
5-202(f) must be applied, rather than the "other personal gain" catch-all provision. "[It] 
is well settled that a more specific provision always takes precedence over a more general 
provision." State v. Hinson, 352 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (UT App. 1998.) 
In this case, "escape from lawful custody" or "for the purpose of avoiding or preventing 
an arrest" (U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(f)) is more specific than "other personal gain" U.C.A. § 
76-5-202(1 )(g). Defendant contends that even if the homicide was committed so that he 
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could leave the Academy (a facility where he was not imprisoned, in custody, or 
otherwise confined by a lawful court order), it does not constitute "other personal gain." 
Therefore, U.C.A. § 76-5-202(1 )(e) controls; and, the State cannot arbitrarily invoke the 
catch-all "other personal gain" provision because the other circumstances do not apply. 
Therefore, subdivision (g) of the aggravated murder statute is unconstitutional on 
its face and/or as applied in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Sean Graham respectfully requests this 
Court: (1) deny the State's request to reverse the portions of District Court's order 
quashing portions of the amended bind over order; and, (2) reverse the portions of the 
District Court's order wherein the court failed to grant Defendant's motion to quash the 
charges of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping and the aggravating circumstance of 
other personal gain. ^ 
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